ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate a secure communication system, where one transmitter sends some confidential message to one receiver, under the smart attack from one unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The UAV utilizes the programmable radio devices to execute multiple attack types, such as eavesdropping, jamming, and spoofing. We consider the practical communication scenarios where there are a limited number of pilot signals for channel estimation, and the channel estimation at the receiver side may be imperfect. To deal with the joint impact of smart attack and imperfect channel estimation, we use the non-cooperative game theory to propose a Q-learning-based power control algorithm in order to obtain an adaptive policy for the transmitter. In this algorithm, a Nash equilibrium strategy of the game under imperfect channel estimation is devised to maximize the utility of the transmitter and, meanwhile, suppress the smart attack from the UAV. The simulation results indicate that this strategy can effectively decrease the attack rate of the UAV attacker and increase the system secrecy capacity, regardless of the channel estimation accuracy. Moreover, the impact of the channel estimation error on the attack rate and secrecy capacity is also reflected.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there is great progress in wireless big data [1] , [2] . In order to meet the communication requirement, many wireless communication researches have been considered [3] . During these studies, a very important research aspect is to guarantee the transmission security, from the physical-layer security to application-layer security [4] , [5] . Due to mobility and ease of deployment, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) [6] have arisen as a new type of smart attackers in the wireless networks, which perform as eavesdroppers [7] , jammers, or spoofers. Smart attackers have been widely used to choose different kinds of attacks on the basis of the continuously changing channel environments [8] , [9] . For instance, the eavesdroppers in the wireless networks can overhear the secure message to improve the capacity by reporting faked channel state information [8] , [10] . Another example is the smart attacker, which can either send spoofing signals or feign to be a relaying node and send jamming signals to attack the system [9] .
To enhance the secrecy performance of wireless communications under some uncertain types of attacks, game theory has been widely used in the existing works. Specifically, in [11] , reinforcement learning has been applied to strengthen the secrecy capacity under an unknown kind of attacks in an ongoing radio channel. In [12] , a power allocation strategy about the interaction between the transmitter and the eavesdropper has been proposed, and the interaction is regarded as a zero-sum game. A power control strategy based on Q-learning has been considered in [13] for the transmitter side to enhance the secure capacity through preventing from smart attacks in the dynamic game. Nevertheless, the game theory has been formulated in [14] did not consider the practical channel estimation error, which should not be ignored in the practical communication scenarios, since it will give a significant impact on the network performance. Yoo and Goldsmith [15] have investigated the impact of channel estimation error on the capacity of specific channels, and proposed the optimal power allocation strategies at the transmitter which achieved the bounds under perfect feedback. As far as we know, there has been no prior work on the impact of the channel estimation error on power control policy for the secure communications.
In this paper, we formulate a secure communication system where one transmitter sends some confidential message to one receiver, against a smart attacker from one UAV. Attack modes of the smart attacker are chosen according to the power of the transmitter as well as the radio channel states. We consider the practical communication with limited pilot signals, so that the channel estimation error may occur [16] , [17] , which has a significant impact on the system secrecy performance. We derive the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the secure communication game, and also analyze the existence condition to investigate the joint impact of the channel estimation error and the attack costs against smart attacks. In the dynamic secrecy communication game, the transmit power level is adaptively set and the quality function of each actionstate pair is updated via the transmission history experience. Simulation results are provided to show that the channel estimation error is a key factor that regulates the system secrecy performance, and a comprehensive and precise policy can not be achieved without considering the channel estimation error.
The contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
• We study the secure communication with the joint impact of the imperfect channel estimation and smart attacker, and make a comparison with the communication with perfect channel estimation.
• We propose a secure communication game under the smart attack from UAV, and deduce the NE with the imperfect channel estimation.
• We apply a power control algorithm with Q-learning for the transmitter to enhance the secrecy performance through preventing from smart attacks. The organization of the rest of the paper is given by follows. We formulate the system model of communication with channel estimation error in Section II, and then study a secrecy transmission game in Section III. We further apply a power control algorithm in dynamic game in Section IV, and present simulation results in Section V. The conclusions of this work are drawn in Section VI. Fig.1 shows the considered system model of the secure communication system, which consists of one Alice, one Bob and one UAV attacker. The Alice sends some confidential message to the Bob against the UAV attacker, and the location information of the UAV is not considered temporarily. For the notation convenience, we refer to the UAV attacker as Eve. As a result of programmable radio devices, Eve is smart to determine its attack type according to transmit power of Alice in each time slot. Eve selects to overhear Alice's signal via the Alice-Eve channel h ae , if Eve can obtain enough information; Eve chooses to send jamming signal if Eve can efficiently hinder Alice's signal; and Eve selects to spoof under low spoofing detection rate. Let q ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , K } denote the action mode of Eve, where K is the number of attack modes. In this work, we set K = 3 and Eve can select to keep silent, eavesdrop, jam or spoof, with q = 0, 1, 2 or 3, respectively. The adaptive transmit power P at the Alice is in the range of [0, P max ], where P max is the maximum transmit power. Alice sends the confidential signal x a , and then Bob receives
II. SYSTEM MODEL
where h ab ∼ CN (0, σ 2 ab ) is the channel parameter of the Alice-Bob link and n b ∼ CN (0, σ 2 n ) is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the Bob [18] , [19] . Bob can estimate the channel parameter h ab , through the help of some pilot signals from the Alice [20] . As in practice, the number of pilots is limited due to the requirement of transmission efficiency, the channel estimation may be nonideal. In this paper, the channel estimation error is modeled by
where ρ 1 ∈ [0, 1] is the accuracy coefficient of the channel estimation and e ab ∼ CN (0, σ 2 ab ) is an AWGN independent of h ab . Specifically, ρ 1 = 1 corresponds to the perfect channel estimation, while ρ 1 = 0 is associated with the completely wrong channel estimation.
According to the Shannon theory, we obtain the data rate of the Alice-Bob link with imperfect channel estimation as
where
If Eve selects to overhear the Alice's signal x a , it receives
where h ae ∼ CN (0, σ 2 ae ) is the channel parameter of the AliceEve link and n e ∼ CN (0, σ 2 n ) is the AWGN at the Eve. As the pilot signals from the Alice are limited in practice, Eve cannot acquire the perfect estimate of h ae . In a similar way, we model the channel estimation error of h ae as
where ρ 2 ∈ [0, 1] is the accuracy coefficient of the channel estimation and e ae ∼ CN (0, σ 2 ae ) is an AWGN independent of h ae . Specifically, ρ 2 = 1 corresponds to the perfect channel estimation, while ρ 2 = 0 is associated with the completely wrong channel estimation.
From (5) and (6), we obtain the data rate of the Alice-Eve link with imperfect channel estimation as
From (3) and (7), we obtain the secrecy data rate of the considered system with imperfect channel estimation as
where [X ] + returns X if X is positive, while returns 0 otherwise.
If Eve chooses to act as a jammer, it transmits a jamming signal z J with the transmit power P J . Accordingly, Bob receives
where h be ∼ CN (0, σ 2 be ) is the channel parameter of the BobEve link. The data rate under jamming is given by
If Eve chooses to send a spoofing signal z S with power P S , Bob acquires the signal y S , which is given by
As the loss in the data rate grows up with the amount of the spoofing signals, we model the secrecy data rate under spoofing attacks, denoted by R 3 , as a linear function for simplicity. In this situation, the purpose of Eve is to send spoofing message to Bob, not to block the transmission of Alice. Consequently, Eve selects to send signals only if Alice keeps silent when the spoofing is chosen. Accordingly, the data rate of Alice under spoofing is written as
and γ ∈ [0, 1] represents the discount value of the effect of each spoofing signal.
III. SECURE TRANSMISSION GAME
In this paper, we study the secure communication by taking into account the joint impact of imperfect channel estimation and smart attacks, and we formulate this problem as a noncooperative static secure game. The Alice adaptively chooses its transmit power P in the range of [0, P max ] and the smart attacker from UAV makes a decision to select its attack mode q ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, corresponding to keeping silent, eavesdropping, jamming and spoofing, respectively. Eve chooses one of attack actions, in order to try the best to decrease the ''secrecy data rate'' of Alice, i.e., R 1 , R 2 or R 3 .
The cost of Eve's attack mode q is denoted by f (q). We set f (q) = 0, θ E , θ J and θ S , respectively, for q = 0, 1, 2 and 3, where θ E , θ J and θ S are the cost of Eve to perform as the eavesdropper, jammer and spoofer, respectively.
In the static game, let u a denote the utility of Alice, which relies on the data rate and the transmit power cost, i.e.,
where C a denotes the cost of unit transmit power of Alice. R q is the q-th element of the secrecy capacity vector [R 0 , R 1 , R 2 , R 3 ]. For the computational convenience, we multiply the data rate by the coefficient ln 2. In a similar way, let u e denote the utility of Eve, which relies on the data rate and the attack cost, i.e.,
In this paper, let (P * , q * ) represent the NE of the game, and we can obtain this policy by deriving the following inequalities.
Neither Alice nor Eve has the motivation to break the NE of the game, as no one can obtain more utility by changing its NE strategy. And an NE (x * , 0) result is given in the following Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: We model the NE (x * , 0) of the static secure game as
0 ≤ x * ≤ P max .
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Proof: If eqs. (21a)-(21c) hold, from (17), we have
Thus, eqs. (19) holds for (x * , 0). From (16), we have ∂u a (P, 0) ∂P
which indicates that ∂u a (P, 0)/∂P monotonically decreases with respect to P. Therefore if (21d) holds, from (22), we have ∂u a (P, 0)
indicating that there is a sole solution of ∂u a (P, 0)/∂P = 0 given in (20a). From (23)- (25), we can find that u a (P, 0) increases with respect to P, if P ≤ x * , while it decreases otherwise. Thus (18) also holds and (x * , 0) is an NE of the game. In this way, we have completed the proof of Lemma 1. As shown in Lemma 1, if the transmission cost of Alice is lower than the attack cost (i.e., eqs. (21a)-(21c)), the attack motivation is suppressed. On the contrary, Alice will stop to transmit if the radio channel environment degrades and information leakage occurs seriously (i.e., eqs. (21d)).
Another NE (P max , 0) result is revealed in the following Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: The static secure game has the NE (P max , 0) if the following equations hold,
,
Proof: If eqs. (26a)-(26c) hold, from (17) , similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we have
Likewise, the two equations of u e (P max , 0) − u e (P max , 2) ≥ 0 and u e (P max , 0)−u e (P max , 3) ≥ 0 show that (19) holds. From (13) and (26d), we can know that ∂u a (P, 0)/∂P monotonically decreases with respect to P, and therefore we have
which indicates that (18) holds, and hence (P max , 0) is also an NE of the game. In this way, we have completed the proof of Lemma 2. From Lemma 2, we can find that Alice will choose the maximum transmit power to send the confidential message, if the transmission cost is low (i.e., (26d)), or the attack cost is high (i.e., (26a)-(26c)).
IV. POWER ALLOCATION POLICY IN DYNAMIC GAME
In the secure communication game, it is difficult for Alice to estimate Eve's action and channel information timely. As the problem is general non-convex [21] - [23] , it is hard to derive an analytical solution. Q-learning, as a frequently used reinforcement learning method, is adopted in this paper by Alice to select the transmit power as its action. Accordingly, Eve chooses the attack type as its action by observing the choice of Alice.
In the following algorithm 1, we present a power control algorithm with Q-learning for the considered secure communication system. Let q n denote the attack mode of Eve at time n. Alice selects to transmit a signal with power level P n from the following L + 1 levels at time n. i.e., P ∈ {lP max /L} 0≤l≤L . The Q function, denoted by Q(s, P), relates to the transmit power P and the system state s, where the system state at time n is related to the Eve's attack type at time n − 1, and s n = q n−1 . The maximum Q(s, P) is denoted by V (s). As shown in algorithm 1, after initializing q 0 , Q(s, P) and V (s), Alice uses ε-greedy policy which manages to balance the exploration and exploitation to choose its transmit power first, i.e., Alice chooses the best action which has the maximum Q with a probability of 1 − ε, while randomly chooses another action with the residual probability ε. Then, Eve selects its attack mode accordingly. The learning rate ζ ∈ [0, 1] indicates the proportion of the current experience that Alice can learn, and the discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1] represents the decay value of Alice's future reward. Via trail and error, Alice can learn Eve's attack types and choose the transmit power to maximize its long-term reward.
Algorithm 1 Power Control With Q-Learning
Update the system state s n by s n = q n−1
4:
Use the ε-greedy policy to choose the transmit power P n 5:
Transmit signal with power P n 6:
Observe the attack type q n and the utility of Alice u a
7:
Update the value function and Q function:
Find the maximum value of the Q function:
9: end for
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide some simulation results to show the joint impact of channel estimation error and smart attacker on the system secrecy performance. In order to simulate the actual situation as much as possible, we consider several cases of channel estimation error with ρ 1 ∈ {0.8, 1}, and ρ 2 ∈ {0.6, 0.8, 1}. The links in the network experience the Rayleigh flat fading [24] . As a typical setting, the average channel gains with σ 2 ab = 1.2, σ 2 be = 2, and σ 2 ae = 0.5 are set [25] . Moreover, the transmit power at the Eve is set to 3 and 3.2, when the jamming and spoofing modes are activated, respectively. In further, we set θ e = 2.5, θ J = 3, θ s = 3.2, C a = 0.1 and γ = 0.5.
Figs. 2 -5 present the secure performance of the proposed power control strategy over time slots, in which the smart attacker from UVA and the transmitter make decisions based on the Q-learning. Specifically, Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 correspond to the secrecy capacity, eavesdropping rate, jamming rate, and spoofing rate, respectively. The time slot ranges from 0 to 8000, and several cases of channel estimation error are considered with ρ 1 ∈ {0.8, 1}, and ρ 2 ∈ {0.6, 0.8, 1}. In particular, we provide the secure performance with the perfect channel estimation, i.e., ρ 1 = ρ 2 = 1, to serve as a benchmark for the system secrecy performance. As observed from Fig. 2 , we can find that the secrecy capacity increases sharply from 0 to 1000 time slots. After 2000 time slots, the curves tend to be steady. When (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) = (1, 0.6), (1, 0.8) , and (1, 1), the secrecy capacity is higher than that with (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) = (0.8, 0.6), (0.8, 0.8), and (0.8, 1), indicating that the impact by ρ 1 on the secrecy performance is much more evident than ρ 2 . Obviously, when (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) = (1, 0.6), the secrecy capacity reaches the highest value, which is a little higher than that with (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) = (1, 1), indicating that the policy performs better if the channel state of h ab is better than that VOLUME 6, 2018 of h ae . Moreover, we can see from Fig. 3 that the proposed power control strategy can reduce the eavesdropping rate of the Eve very efficiently. Compared to the scenarios with (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) = (1, 0.6), (1, 0.8), and (1, 1), the eavesdropping rate decreases much more quickly than that with (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) = (0.8, 0.6), (0.8, 0.8), and (0.8, 1). For example, the eavesdropping rate with (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) = (1, 0.6) falls to 5% over 100 time slots, while that with (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) = (1, 1) reduces to 5% after 500 time slots, This shows that the policy performs better with worse estimate of h ae . Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show the results of jamming and spoofing rates, respectively, which have the similar phenomena as Fig. 3 . Fig. 6 illustrates the impact of different channel estimation accuracy on the eavesdropping rate of the considered system when the time slot is set to 50000, where ρ 1 varies from 0.5 to 1 and ρ 2 varies in {0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1}. We can find from this figure that the system eavesdropping rate varies significantly with the channel estimation accuracy ρ 1 and ρ 2 . Moreover, for a fixed value of ρ 1 , the attack rate decreases much faster with the value of ρ 2 . In further, the jamming and spoofing rates yield the similar variation tendency with the channel estimation error.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we have studied the secure communication with the imperfect channel estimation, under the smart UAV attacker. The attacker operated in the several modes of keeping silent, eavesdropping, jamming, and spoofing. The noncooperative game theory has been utilized to propose a power control algorithm with the Q-learning, in order to obtain an adaptive policy for the transmitter. In this algorithm, the NE strategy of the game under the imperfect channel estimation was devised to maximize the utility of the transmitter and meanwhile suppress the smart attack from the UAV, Simulation results have been demonstrated to present that the proposed strategy can efficiently enhance the secure performance and meanwhile decrease the attack rate, irrespective of the channel estimation error. But the shortcoming of this algorithm in this paper is not to be ignored, both sides of the confrontation must know the action space of each other, that is to say, this algorithm satisfies convergence but rationality. In the future works, we will optimize the system model and algorithm, incorporate some application-layer techniques as well as some physical-layer transmission techniques [26] - [28] to further enhance the transmission security. 
